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A recent article in the New York Times captioned "Love, sex and
politics? Sure. Salary? No way" discusses Americans' strong aversion to
talking about their salaries.' The piece notes that while discussion of
financial matters is often acceptable in some parts of the world, it is
generally considered "crass" in the United States.2 In short, discussion by
individuals of their salaries and related matters can be seen as violating an
American "social norm."3 One-third of United States private sector
employers have reinforced this norm by adopting specific rules prohibiting
employees from discussing their wages with co-workers, rules known as
pay secrecy/confidentiality ("PSC") rules.' Moreover, legal and human
resource management experts recognize that in addition to workplaces with
specific PSC rules, a significant number of other employers have more
informal expectations that employees "keep their lips sealed about their
salaries." 5
However, employer PSC rules and even informal employer
expectations of employee "discretion"6 in this area conflict directly with the
law. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects the
rights of all employees, whether represented by a union or not, to engage in
1. See Abby Ellin, Want to Stop the Conversation? Just Mention Your Finances, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2003, § 3, at 9.
2. Id.
3. See infra notes 71-108 and accompanying text.
4. See More Employers Ducking Pay Confidentiality Issue: HRnext.com Survey Shows Many
Employers View Issue as Hot Potato, available at http://www.hrnet.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2003)
[hereinafter "HRnext Survey"]; Mary Williams Walsh, The Biggest Company Secret; Workers
Challenge Employer Policies on Pay Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 2000, at Cl.
5. See Sacha Cohen, Shhh, They're Talking Salary, USA Today Job Center, available at
http://www.USAtoday.com/jobcenter/obhunt/salary/2002-12-salary-talk-x.html (Dec. 20, 2002).
6. Id.
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"concerted activity for the purpose of... mutual aid or protection."7  The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts have
regularly held that discussions among employees regarding their wages
represent "protected concerted activity" per section 7 of the NLRA.8
Indeed, as one former member of the NLRB recently noted,9 the right of
employees to talk to each other about pay is as fundamental as any activity
intended to receive NLRA protection, given that pay discussions among
disgruntled employees are often at the heart of unionization activity."
Thus, it is not at all surprising that in the relatively limited number of cases
on point, the NLRB and the federal courts have routinely found employer
PSC rules to be unlawful under the NLRA because these rules
impermissibly chill employees' rights under section 7 of the NLRA.1"
In sum, the NLRA essentially outlaws most employer PSC rules.
Nevertheless, pursuant to prevalent social norms, employer PSC rules
continue to flourish throughout the country. The issue is what, if anything,
should be done about this rather anomalous situation.
B. Addressing the Conflict
The extant conflict between employer PSC rules and the NLRA has not
escaped the attention of policy-makers. For example, legislators have
introduced a number of bills in the U.S. Congress on the subject, 2 and the
state of California recently enacted state legislation dealing with the issue.13
Moreover, commentators have made rulemaking proposals to the NLRB
with respect to strengthening NLRB enforcement powers in this general
area. 14
This essay engages this debate by examining the controversy from a
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
8. See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 173-74, 79 (1997); NLRB v.
Main St. Terrace Ctr,, 218 F. 3d. 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2000).
9. Telephone Interview with John E. Higgins, Member, National Labor Relations Board (July 3,
2003).
10. See, e.g., Aaron Nathans, Love the Worker, Not the Union, A Store Says as Some Organize,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at Cl (noting employee dissatisfaction with "subjective" pay increases as a
significant issue in a recent successful union organizing drive at the Whole Foods Market in Madison,
Wisconsin).
11. See, e.g., Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F. 2d 916, 918 (3rd Cir. 1976).
12. See, e.g., Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 76, 108th Cong. § 3(d) (2003); Fair Pay Act, H.R. 1362,
107th Cong. (2001); Wage Awareness Protection Act, S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000).
13. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 232, 232.5 (West 2002).
14. See Rulemaking Petition of Professor Charles J. Morris to the National Labor Relations Board
(Feb. 9, 1993) (on file with authors) [hereinafter "Rulemaking Petition of Prof. Morris"]. For an
extensive theoretical discussion of the issues underpinning Professor Morris' bringing this rulemaking
petition to the NLRB see Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at
a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (1989) [hereinafter "Morris, NLRB
Protection in the Nonunion Workplace"].
2004
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social norms perspective, and asks the question whether new federal and/or
state legislation should address this conflict. The essay asserts that a
workable system of legal regulation can be formulated only by
understanding the social norms surrounding the situation. In this regard, the
piece attempts to build on the recent work of Professor Lior Strahilevitz
examining the interplay between copyright law and the widespread social
norm-generated prevalence of music file-swapping, 5 and on recent writing
dealing with the interplay of social norms and the law in Southern states
prior to the Civil War.16 This essay examines the role social norms have
played in the enforcement of employment law and the NLRA.
Part II of this essay briefly discusses PSC rules and their illegality
under the NLRA. Part III addresses the general interplay of social norms
and the law, and by examining the work of Nobel Laureate Professor
George Akerlof 7 and others, it reviews the important role social norms play
in the workplace.' 8 Next, the essay examines a variety of important norm-
related considerations that operate in favor of employer PSC rules. Part IV
takes our analysis a step further by pointing out the various other forces
operating at the workplace that could lead employees to deviate from the
social norm of silence, opposing forces that help explain the existence of
PSC rules. Part V examines the various recent congressional and academic
proposals on the subject, as well as the relevant California legislation. It
argues, somewhat counterintuitively, that new legislation in this area is
neither necessary nor consistent with prevalent social norms analysis.
II.
PSC RULES AND THE NLRA
A. PSC Rules
The issue of workplace pay confidentiality or secrecy has been around
since ancient times. Indeed, the famous New Testament parable involving
the phrase "the last shall be first, and the first last" actually involved a
15. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REv. 505 (2003) [hereinafter "Strahilevitz,
Charismatic Code"].
16. See C.A. Harwell Wells, Note, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in
Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1805 (2001) [hereinafter "Vanderbilt Note"].
17. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 413 (2002) [hereinafter Akerlof, "Behavioral Macroeconomics"].
18. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr, et al., When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in
Experimental Labor Markets, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 324 (1998); William Encinosa, et al., The Sociology of
Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5953, 1997); Donald Roy, Quota Restriction and Goldbricking
in a Machine Shop, 57 AM. J. SOC. 427 (1952).
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dispute over the rights of laborers to know what other laborers were being
paid.19 The practice of pay secrecy or confidentiality continues to be a
contentious issue in today's workplace, with employers confronted with the
decision whether to allow employees to discuss their pay openly or instead
to require them to keep information regarding their compensation
confidential. 20
PSC rules are workplace rules prohibiting employees from discussing
their wages with their co-workers or others. 1 The rules are commonly
found in employment manuals 22 or orally' conveyed to employees at the
time of hiring or at some later point in the employment relationship.
23
Variants of these rules apply only to certain proprietary information; for
example, an employee who works in the payroll department of a business is
prohibited from disclosing information obtained in the course of his or her
employment.24
PSC rules are quite common in United States workplaces. As noted
above,21 survey data shows that over one-third of private sector employers
have rules of this kind. In contrast, only about one in ten employers have
actively adopted "pay openness" policies.26 About fifty-one percent of
employers surveyed stated they did not have any specific policy regarding
pay secrecy or confidentiality. 27 As noted above, however, some of these
employers may communicate expectations of employee pay confidentiality
informally.28 As one leading legal observer recently noted, it is generally
"the unwritten law" that American employees keep their mouths shut about
their salaries.29 Similarly, a comprehensive study of employment practices
in the United States and Canada found that pay secrecy was "an important
fact of life in many organizations."3  Finally, a consistent finding in
19. Matthew 20: 1-16.
20. See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
21. See Julio D. Burroughs, Pay Secrecy and Performance: The Psychological Research, 1982
COMPENSATION REV. 44 (1982) (discussing the effects of pay confidentiality rules on employee
performance); Paul Thompson & John Pronsky, Secrecy or Disclosure in Management Compensation?,
BUS. HORIZONS, June, 1975 at 67 (comparing open and confidential pay systems).
22. See, e.g., Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 168 (1997) (challenge to
pay confidentiality rule found in the employment manual).
23. See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2000) (involving a
statement by a supervisor indicating that employees "were not allowed to discuss our paychecks with
anyone").
24. See, e.g., IBM, 265 N.L.R.B. 638 (1982) (upholding the discharge of an employee for
releasing confidential information collected and classified as confidential by the employer).
25. See HRnext Survey, supra note 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Cohen, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. Id. (quoting Lee E. Miller, Esq., former co-chair of the labor and employment law department
of a leading law firm, and a prominent author and consultant in the employment law area).
30. PAUL W. MULVEY, ET AL., THE KNOWLEDGE OF PAY STUDY 26 (2002).
2004
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academic research dating back to the 1970s is that a large proportion of
managers agree with the use of PSC rules.3"
B. Legal Framework Under the NLRA
What makes the prevalence of these rules so interesting is that the
NLRB and federal courts have rather consistently found them illegal under
the NLRA 2 Section 7 of the NLRA affords employees the right to engage
in "concerted activity for the purpose of.. . mutual aid or protection," and
employer actions which "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" with
respect to the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights constitute unlawful or
unfair labor practices. 3
For example, in Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror, Inc. the NLRB
considered a PSC rule included in an employee manual.34 The given rule
stated that employees' earnings were "a confidential matter between the
employee and his earnings supervisor," and thus that any discussions
among employees involving earnings "will result in dismissal and/or
disciplinary action at the supervisor's discretion."35 The NLRB upheld an
earlier administrative law judge finding that the PSC rule unlawfully
interfered with employees' Section 7 rights. 6
Courts have reached similar conclusions in cases where the given PSC
rule has been orally communicated to employees during the course of their
employment.37 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Main Street Terrace
Center found an employer's orally communicated PSC rule to be illegal,
even though the rule was not regularly enforced.3" The court held that
irregular enforcement of the PSC rule was irrelevant since in unfair labor
practice cases of this kind "the actual effect of a statement is not as
important as is its tendency to coerce."39
In sum, employer PSC rules have generally been struck down because
they directly interfere with employees' NLRA Section 7 rights.40 Section 7
of the NLRA applies to employees in nearly all private sector workplaces in
31. See, e.g., Charles M. Futrell & Omer E. Jenkins, Pay Secrecy Versus Pay Disclosure for
Salesmen: A Longitudinal Study, 15 J. MARKETING RES. 214 (1978).
32. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
34. See323 N.L.R.B. 165 (1997).
35. Id at 165.
36. Id,
37. See, e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Ctr., 218 F. 3d 531 (6th Cir. 2000).
38. Id. at 531, 534-39.
39. Id. at 539.
40. The NLRB and federal courts have, to date, given relatively short shrift to various
defenses/legitimate business justifications raised by employers for having PSC rules. See, e.g., Jeannette
Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1976) (rejecting employer arguments that PSC rules were
necessary to reduce conflict among employees).
HeinOnline  -- 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 172 2004
WORKPLACE SOCIAL NORMS
the United States, regardless of whether such employees are formally
represented by a labor union." Despite this, however, PSC rules continue
to flourish in workplaces throughout the United States.
III.
SOCIAL NORMS AND PSC RULES
A. The Interplay of Law and Social Norms
Social norms are "social regularities" or behaviors that are widely
adopted in society. 2 Moreover, they are activities that "society holds that
people should do."'43 As Professor Lawrence Lessig observes, social norms
"frown on the racist's joke; they tell the stranger to tip a waiter at a highway
diner; they are unsure about whether a man should hold a door open for a
woman." '44 Social norms differ among cultures, and within given cultures
during different periods of time." Using Professor Lessig's example of
whether a man should hold open a door for a woman, different social norms
likely govern this issue differently in various countries throughout the
world.46
While long one of the most important contructs in the field of
sociology, social norms have only recently received significant attention
from legal scholars. 7  In path-breaking work in the 1990s, Yale Law
Professor Robert C. Ellickson,4" University of Chicago Law Professor Lisa
Bernstein,49 and others began examining the interplay between social norms
and the law." Much of the early work in this area focused on how social
41. See Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace, supra note 14; NLRB v. Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
42. See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 16, at 1809.
43. Id.
44. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998).
45. For example, in many countries today, and even historically in some parts of the United States,
social norms favored the use of mass transit as a way to get to work. Today in the United States,
however, there is a fairly strong social norm favoring solo commuting in one's own car. See Lior
Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California's
Carpool Lanes, 79 IND. L. J. 1231 (2000) [hereinafter "Strahilevitz, Changes in Property Regimes").
46. Clearly social norms regarding gender roles have varied widely historically, and continue to
vary widely throughout the world. See RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: How THE MODERN
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA (2000); MARY JOE FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1992).
47. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Expanding the Behavioral Foundations of Labor Economics, 52 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 361,370 (1999).
48. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DtSPUTES
(1991).
49. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1995).
50. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996)
[hereinafter "Sunstein, Social Norms"); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U.
2004
HeinOnline  -- 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 173 2004
174 BERKELEYJOURAAL OF EMPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 25:1
norms can serve as an effective substitute for formal laws. For example,
Professor Bernstein examines successful self-regulation by Jewish diamond
merchants in her classic work, "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry."51  Professor Ellickson
develops a similar theme involving rural cattle ranchers in his seminal 1991
book, "Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes."52
As noted earlier, more recent work examines how social norms may
lead to noncompliance or indifference toward laws that conflict with social
practice.53 For example, a 2001 piece in the Vanderbilt Law Review entitled
"The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in
Antebellum America," explores the eighteenth and nineteenth century
American social practice of Southern (and other) "gentlemen" resolving
disputes by having a "duel."54  Beginning around 1800, Southern states
began passing a wide array of anti-dueling laws.55 Social norms, however,
prevented these laws from being enforced for over sixty years. 6 Not until
the Civil War, and the war's elimination of much of the pro-dueling
"aristocracy" of the "Old South," did social norms in this area give way to
the law."
Professor Lior Strahilevitz explores a more contemporary interaction
between norms and law in "Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks,"58 Professor
Strahilevitz examines the present conflict between copyright law and social
norms: guided music file-swapping conducted in violation of this law.
Other legal scholars have entered the Napster/Gnutella/Kazaa social norms
versus copyright law debate. Professor Marci A. Hamilton, for example, has
forcefully argued that the current "anti-copyright culture" needs to be
stopped, and that college students need to be sued for "illegal music
downloading."59 Other observers, however, argue that the courts have more
PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943 (1995); Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135 (1996).
51. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
52. See ELLICKSON, supra note 48. Through self-regulatory "contractual" schemes, for example,
parties can engage in business relations without entering into formal contracts enforceable in courts of
law. See generally Bernstein, supra note 51.
53. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
54. See Vanderbilt Note, supra note 16.
55. Id. at 1825-30.
56. Id. at 1831-38.
57. Id. at 1832-42.
58. See Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, supra note 15.
59. See Marci A. Hamilton, Why Suing College Students for Illegal Music Downloading Is Right,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/07/findlaw.analysis.hamilton.music (last visited Aug. 7,
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important things to focus on, and that the music industry should "hang
loose" on the issue.60
B. Workplace Social Norms
As Professor Jon Elster observes, the "workplace is a hotbed for norm-
guided action.",61 Social norms, for example, have long had an important
impact on gender roles in employment and work/family concerns.62
Moreover, one of the central conclusions of industrial experiments of the
1930s was that employee work effort is significantly influenced by the
norms of the employee's workgroup with respect to what constitutes an
appropriate work level or output.63 Applying this analysis, employees are
deemed rational when they do not increase output in response to increased
employer incentives such as pay because they are simply responding to
workplace social norms.'
Professor George Akerlof argues that in some workplaces a norm-
guided "code of honor"65 exists which regulates, for example, the extent to
which current employees are willing to train newly hired workers.66
Professor Akerlof has further argued that workplace rates of pay are not
infrequently determined in response to such codes of honor and other
workplace social norms.67 Other observers have pointed out that in the
workplace, breaching norms can sometimes have more "serious
consequences" than breaching the law.68
An examination of PSC rules from a social norms perspective builds
directly on the work of Professor Akerlof and others in this area. Much like
Professor Akerlof's workplace "code of honor," a "code of silence" exists
with respect to the issue of pay in a large number of workplaces throughout
the country. The social norms behind the establishment of these codes of
silence are strong, and the potential consequences of breaching these norms
are seen by many as being serious. In the next section we describe in detail
various workplace norm-related considerations that might help explain the
2003).
60. See Steven Levy, Pirates of the Internet, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 2003, at 48.
61. Jon Elster, Social Norm and Economic Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 101 (1989).
62. See, e.g., Belinda M. Smith, Time Norms In the Workplace: Their Exclusionary Effect and
Potentialfor Change, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 271 (2002); FRUG, supra note 46.
63. See Kaufman, supra note 47, at 370.
64. These employees don't want to be ostracized by their fellow workers as "ratebusters." Id. See
also Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics, supra note 17, at 415.
65. Pursuant to such a "code of honor" workers develop their own code of workplace self-
regulation and rules of behavior.
66. See George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One
Consequence, 94 Q. J. OF ECON. 749, 753 (1980).
67. See Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics, supra note 17, at 415.
68. See Smith, supra note 62, at 349.
2004
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existence of this "code of silence."
C. Norm-Related Considerations Favoring Employer PSC Rules
1. Privacy Considerations
As developed at the beginning of this essay, Americans have a strong
aversion to talking about their salary and related matters. For many
individuals their rate of pay is a very private matter.69 They do not want
their employer telling everyone their rate of pay, and they do not want
inquisitive co-workers constantly asking them about this matter.7°
The reasons individuals want to keep such information private are
quite complex.7  Some individuals might not want pay or related
information revealed because it might lead others to think less well of them,
while others may be concerned that the revelation of such information may
jeopardize an unusually "sweet deal" they have at work.72 In other cases,
individuals may be concerned about flaunting their success and wealth."
All in all, surveys of employees have found that a majority are in favor of
workplace pay secrecy policies, and the primary reason they give for
favoring such policies is that such policies protect privacy.74
Employee concerns for privacy in this regard are consistent with
general recent trends in American society toward greater "individualism."75
While always something of an individualistic society, there is considerable
evidence that the overall social structure of the United States has become
even more individualistic and solitary in recent decades.76 In an important
work entitled "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital,"
Professor Robert Putman highlights a general decline in "civic engagement"
on the part of Americans,77 and others have pointed out general societal
69. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
70. See John Case, When Salaries Aren't Secret, 79 HARV. BUS. REV. 37, 44 (2002) (quoting a
statement by Victor Sim, Vice President, Prudential Insurance Company).
71. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 460, 473 (2002).
72. See id. at 473.
73. See Elster, supra note 61, at 110.
74. See generally Jay R. Schuster & Jerome A. Colletti, Pay Secrecy: Who Is For and Against It?,
16 ACAD. MGMT. J. 35 (1973); Alex Markels & Lee Berton, Executive Pay, Special Report, Something
to Talk About: Do You Know What Your Colleagues Make?, WALL ST. J., April 11, 1996, at R 10, Col.
.
75. See Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause
for Labor's Decline, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 138-41 (1998); ROBERT N. BELLAH, HABITS OF
THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
76. See Margalioth, supra note 75, at 152.
77. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY
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declines in levels of "trust"78 and in extended familial relations.79 In an
insightful article, Professor Sharon Margalioth notes how this greater
societal emphasis on individuality and distrust of others has helped lead to
the decline in unionization in the United States.8" The world is a much less
"collectively" oriented place today than it was nearly seventy years ago
when the NLRA was enacted.8 In such a world, employee support for the
privacy afforded by employer PSC rules in many ways seems very
appropriate.
Finally, employee support for PSC rules on privacy grounds comports
with increased employer concerns about protecting the proprietary nature of
their employee compensation plans. As Professors Lucian Bebchuk and
Jesse Fried have recently pointed out, many U.S. corporations put
considerable effort into designing employee compensation plans, often
paying considerable sums to outside compensation consultants to assist in
this endeavor.82 Human resources professionals believe that properly
designed employee compensation programs can represent a source of
company competitive advantage.83  Therefore, employers also have
expressed legitimate concerns about protecting the privacy of workplace
pay and related information.
2. Workplace Conflict Avoidance Considerations
Social psychologists have long emphasized the important social norm-
related consideration of avoiding "conflict" in the workplace.84 From a
variety of perspectives, employer PSC rules help achieve this goal.
Employers argue that PSC rules are necessary to limit "jealousies and strife
among employees."85  This argument is based on the understanding that
knowledge of differentials in wages among employees will generate
64-73 (1995). See also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
78. See Lawrence M. Friedman, American Legal Culture: The Last Thirty-Five Years, 35 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 529, 533 (1991); Margalioth, supra note 75, at 152-54.
79. See Margalioth, supra note 75, at 152-54.
80. Id. at 136-53.
81. Id. at 152-57.
82. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
83. See Barry Gerhart, Compensation Strategy and Organizational Performance, in
COMPENSATION IN ORGANIZATIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 151 (Sara L. Rynes & Barry
Gerhart eds., 2000).
84. See, e.g., Gerald S. Leventhal, The Distribution of Rewards and Resources in Groups and
Organizations, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 92 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine
Walster eds., 1976); Gerald S. Leventhal, et al., Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Preferences,
in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerald Mikula ed., 1980).
85. See, e.g., Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 919 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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conflicts among employees.86  Employees observe wage differentials
without the full information necessary to evaluate the justifications for the
differing wages.87 This, in turn, strains relationships among employees and
creates a climate of workplace conflict.88
In addition, pursuant to equity theory, an individual who is happy with
her rate of pay will likely become unhappy if she learns that an employee
she deems to be a peer is being paid more.89 This is particularly true given
the fact, as Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has noted, that systems for
rewarding individuals can be less than perfect, and relevant information
about the reasoning behind specific rewards imperfectly communicated.90
Moreover, workplace pay openness may foster greater employee
efforts to engage in "influence behavior," whereby employees try through
various methods to persuade their employer to give them a raise.9 Ongoing
employee activities of this kind have the potential to create conflict among
employees, and between employees and their supervisors. Thus, leading
economists argue that employers engage in pay secrecy because the cost of
the manipulative employee behavior resulting from pay openness policies
makes pay openness inefficient.9"
3. Remuneration Risk-Sharing Considerations
Two additional factors that reinforce the social norm of pay secrecy are
employee risk-aversion and employer prevention of worker opportunism. In
a recent article entitled "Wage Secrecy as a Social Convention,"9 3
economics professors Leif Danziger and Eliakim Katz discuss the interplay
86. See Case, supra note 70, at 48. See generally Robert L. Opsahl, Managerial Compensation:
Needed Research, 2 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 208 (1967) (arguing that open pay systems
make individual differences too readily apparent, leading to negative effects on group cohesion and
satisfaction).
87. See Case, supra note 70, at 48; see also George A. Akerlof& Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-
Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment, 105 Q. J. ECON. 255, 264 (1990); George T. Milkovich & Phillip
H. Anderson, Managerial Compensation and Secrecy Policies, 25 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 293 (1972).
88. See Case, supra note 70, at 46.
89. See Miriam Dornstein, The Fairness Judgments of Received Pay and Their Determinants, 62
J. OCCUP. PSYCH. 287 (1989); MIRIAM DORNSTEIN, CONCEPTIONS OF FAIR PAY: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (1991).
90. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4,
54 n.133 (1994).
91. See Kathryn M. Bartol & David C. Martin, Effects of Dependence, Dependency Threats, and
Pay Secrecy on Managerial Pay Allocations, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 105, 106 (1989); Gerald R. Ferris &
Timothy A. Judge, Personnel/Human Resources Management: A Political Influence Perspective, 17 J.
MGMT. 447 (1991).
92. See JAMES A. BRICKLEY, ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
ARCHITECTURE 375 (2003).
93. Leif Danziger & Eliakim Katz, Wage Secrecy as a Social Convention, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 59
(1997).
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between pay confidentiality and these factors. Professors Danziger and Katz
note that employees generally are "risk-averse" and strongly prefer fixed or
guaranteed wage streams, as opposed to wage streams that are dependent on
general business conditions and/or given period work performance.94 Most
employees would rather be paid a fixed $5000 per month ($60,000 per
year), rather than wages that vary widely per month based on business
conditions and/or employee performance, even if ultimately they were to
receive the same $60,000 per year. Most employees view income volatility
as a "cost," especially when such volatility or variability is at least partially
caused by factors beyond their control such as macro-economic business
conditions, weather, and general economic trends.95 The result is that
employers generally bear these macro-economic and other risks and simply
pay employees their fixed monthly stipends.
Bearing these risks also comes with potential costs to employers.
Knowing that their monthly incomes are fixed, some workers may work
less hard or "shirk" their duties.9 6 Moreover, other workers may stay with
their current firm only during the bad times, and then move on to "greener
pastures" when economic conditions improve. Labor mobility of this kind
is facilitated by workers' ability to talk to fellow employees about pay,
including other job offers employees have received.97 Thus, Professors
Danziger and Katz argue that employers adopt pay secrecy polices to help
prevent employee "opportunism" in risk-shifting compensation policy
situations.98 In sum, by helping reduce labor mobility, employer PSC rules
help further the important social goal of guaranteed employee remuneration.
4. Internal Labor Market Considerations
The development of internal labor market norms in workplaces
throughout the United States is a growing trend.99 This development has
become more pronounced as greater numbers of employees find work in
complex "knowledge economy" computer, scientific, and other related
94. Id. at 60-69.
95. See Haig R. Nalbantian, Incentive Compensation in Perspective, in INCENTIVES,
COOPERATION, AND RISK SHARING: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS 3, 10-15 (Haig R. Nalbantian ed., 1987); Eugene F. Fama, Time, Salary, and Incentive
Payoffs in Labor Contracts, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 25, 37 (1991).
96. See Danziger & Katz, supra note 93, at 60-69.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics, and
Negotiations Approach, 68 SO. CAL. L. REV. 363 (1995); Stewart J. Schwab, Life Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993); Michael L. Wachter &
George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application
to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1988).
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types of jobs.'00 According to internal labor market theory, employees
increasingly are required to make "firm specific" investments in their given
firms."0 ' Such firm specific investments, however, may be hard to value.
To the extent employers value such investments highly,'0 2 such valuations
may be extremely controversial among other employees.'03 By preventing
discussion of high rewards given to employee firm-specific investments,
employer PSC rules facilitate the maintenance of internal labor markets.
For example, perhaps a university has a strong football tradition and
the law school dean wants a certain law faculty member (perhaps a former
football player) to serve on a special university committee that meets to
study the merits of retaining this tradition. This commitment is a "firm
specific" investment by the professor and an investment in the "internal
labor market" of the given university. The hours the professor spends on
this endeavor may win the faculty member some "good citizen" points at
that university, but that experience will likely be of little interest to other
universities should the professor apply for a job in the future. Indeed, from
the perspective of other universities, i.e., the "external labor market," the
professor would be much better off spending that time working on an article
for publication in a prestigious law journal.
The dilemma is thus clear. The organization wants the employee to
make the firm-specific investment, but the employee may resist. The
faculty member, especially if untenured, wants to keep his options open by
developing a general skill set that is readily marketable in the external labor
market.
One way organizations deal with this dilemma is by giving especially
large salary increases to employees who make firm-specific investments.
Indeed, the professor making this investment in the law school's internal
labor market may argue that he is entitled to an especially large pay
increase since his special committee work has left him generally less
"marketable."'" However, such large pay increases are by their nature
100. See Peter Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, November, 1994,
at 53, available at http://theatlantic.com/politics/ecbig/soctrans.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2003); Brook
Manville & Josiah Ober, Beyond Empowerment: Building a Company of Citizens, 81 HARV. BUS. REV.
48 (2003); Paul S. Adler, Markets, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of
Capitalism, 12 ORG. SCI. 215, 216 (2001).
101. See Bierman & Gely, supra note 99, at 370-83.
102. For one, internal labor market investments may create something of a "lock-in" effect for
employees making such investments, limiting their outside employment opportunities. Thus, their
present employer may need to specially reward such employees. See Schwab, supra note 99, at 13.
103. In part this is because it is much harder to value things like service on a special organizational
committee etc. than it is some other employee performance criteria, e.g., number of billable hours in a
law firm. To avoid this conflict, in the legal profession, for example, some British law firms pay partners
on the basis of seniority. See Lawyers Go Global, the Battle of the Atlantic, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26,
2000, at 79-80.
104. See Schwab, supra note 99, at 13.
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highly subjective in nature and potentially controversial. In short, pay
secrecy can be extremely helpful to managers running organizations where
employee firm-specific investments are seen as being important. PSC rules
help managers non-disruptively reward employee internal labor market
investment, in an economy where employee investments of this kind are
increasingly important in in nature.1 °5
D. Summary
We argue that a number of factors that operate in workplaces across
the United States help explain the adoption of employer PSC rules and
employee observance of these rules. However, the factors described above
provide only a partial explanation for the adoption of these rules by
employers. If employees on their own prefer not to have discussions about
wages, why is there a need for employers to act and affirmatively adopt
such rules, particularly where those rules are illegal under current law?
That is, why are PSC rules needed in the face of social employee norms that
support their existence? To fully answer this question we consider what
other forces make employer PSC rules so common.
IV.
OPPOSING FORCES
Like laws, norms and related considerations do not prevent non-
compliant behavior absolutely.1 °6 While both laws and norms impose some
consequences on deviant behavior, violations do occur. In order to fully
understand the dynamics of employer PSC rules, we also need to identify
the forces that may lead workers to deviate from these norms.
A. The Seductive Sound of Talking: Role of the Prisoners'Dilemma
On average, individuals in a group must believe that they are better off
complying with a norm than disregarding the norm.10 7 That is, the net effect
on social welfare for those subject to the norm must be positive. As in
many other kinds of scenarios involving group action, such as the OPEC oil
cartel, the application of norms involves a collective action problem. 08
105. See Augustine A. Lado & Mary C. Wilson, Human Resource Systems and Sustained
Competitive Advantage: A Competency-Based Perspective, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 699, 704-05 (1994).
106. See Strahilevitz, Changes in Property Regimes, supra note 45, at 1281 (describing the
dynamics of non-compliant behavior regarding carpooling norms).
107. See Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 380-81 (1997) (discussing the process of internalization of norms). The cost/benefits tradeoff
might not be sufficient to explain the formation of norms, but it is certainly a factor in their formation.
108. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1960). See also Keith N. Hylton, A
Theory of Minimum Contract Terms with Implications for Labor Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1763-69
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While the group will be better off by obeying the norm, individuals (or in
the case of OPEC, certain oil-producing countries) might benefit from
defecting or cheating." 9  A so-called "prisoners' dilemma" is thus
formed. "'
The norms against discussing wages in the workplace appear to create
such a situation. For these norms against the public discussion of wages to
endure, it appears that their net effect must be an increase in the welfare of
those affected by the norm. The benefits of these norms might include
reduction in workplace conflict, a more efficient allocation of
compensation, and greater flexibility in rewarding idiosyncratic firm-
specific investments. These benefits arguably should make all workers
better off than they would be under a regime in which discussions about pay
are openly permitted and even encouraged.
While, on average, groups of employees might be better off following
these norms, for certain individuals there might exist some incentives to
defect or cheat. Information about wages, performance, and rewards
structures can be useful for individual employees."' Armed with such
information, employees may negotiate better compensation. The incentive
to defect will be particularly strong if the employee sees few adverse
consequences resulting from the non-compliant behavior."2 For example,
an individual with no expectation of long-term employment at a particular
workplace will probably be more likely to defect than an individual who
sees the current job as a long-term prospect. Since the adverse
consequences of violating norms, particularly workplace norms, are likely
to be in large measure social, an employee who intends to leave soon
correctly figures that violating the norm may make sense. In short, some
individuals might have incentives to cheat and violate norms.
B. Keeping Up with the Joneses: the Relative Preferences Theory
According to the theory of relative preferences, individuals care not
only about their absolute income levels, but also about their relative income
standings among their peers.' Individuals constantly engage in a tradeoff
(1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1041
(1984).
109. See McAdams, supra note 107, at 352-54.
110. Id.
111. For one, such information clearly gives employees better data on which to base "influence
behavior." See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
112. See Strahilevitz, Changes in Property Regimes, supra note 45, at 1272-84.
113. See Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 549,
570 (1984) (arguing that in a model that assumes that individual preferences are relative, the wage
structure within a firm must be one in which individuals are not paid their marginal products)
[hereinafter "Frank, Marginal Products"]; ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 3-34 (1985) (developing the theory of relative preferences).
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between wages and income based status within an organization. Those who
have strong preferences for status will "pay" for the privilege to be the
highest paid employee by accepting a wage less than their marginal
productivity.' 14  Those who care less about status will require a wage
premium for being at the bottom of the status hierarchy." 5
Therefore, the existence of markets for local status suggests that some
employees concerned with status will prefer to have open discussions about
wages and other terms and conditions of employment." 6  To properly
evaluate the tradeoffs that they have made between status and income,
employees for whom status matters significantly will need to know their
position in the local hierarchy by, for example, making wage
comparisons." 7
C. Bringing it All Together
We have identified both the dynamics that are consistent with the norm
against the public discussion of wages at the workplace and the forces that
might lead employees to violate this norm. We are now in a position to
explain more completely the common occurrence of PSC rules in
workplaces across the United States. We provide two explanations: (1)
PSC rules complement social norms, and (2) PSC rules legitimize social
norms.
First, while norms of silence exist, forces that generate deviant
behavior also exist. For example, some employees might see
See also Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (developing the
implications of the theory of relative preferences for a number of legal issues).
114. See Frank, Marginal Products, supra note 113, at 551.
115. The wage premium is in the form of a wage rate above that employee's marginal productivity.
Id.
116. The market for local status explains why, unlike as predicted by neoclassical economists,
workers often do not appear to get paid their marginal productivities. See id. at 553-55. Traditional
neoclassical economists have long advanced the argument that workers will be paid their marginal
products, that is workers are paid an amount equal to their contributions to the total revenue of the firm.
Otherwise, it has been argued, employees that are paid less than their marginal product will leave to go
to firms that will agree to pay the higher wage. Id. at 549-50. This standard account has been criticized
as inconsistent with the compensation practices observed in many organizations. Id. at 555-64.
Considerable evidence has been advanced that shows that wage differentials within firms tend to be
considerably smaller than what the neoclassical marginal productivity model would predict, suggesting
that the most productive workers are being paid less than their marginal productivities, while the least
productive workers are being paid more than what they contribute to the revenues of the firm. Id.
117. If what employees' value are not only absolute levels of compensation ("how much I am
paid") but also relative levels of compensation ("how much I am paid in comparison to others"), it will
be important for these employees to have information about wages in their local hierarchies. Indeed, the
employer could be expected to voluntarily disclose that information. Overall the wage bill for the
employer remains the same - all that is changing is the distribution of wages inside the firm, but not the
total cost of labor. Futhermore, facilitating the market for local status leads to better matching between
workers' preferences and jobs and also leads to potential efficiency gains for employers.
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individual/short-term advantages to violating the silence norm or might be
hypersensitive to local status issues. In this scenario, a norm of silence
might not be enough to eliminate non-normative behavior. Accordingly,
PSC rules would be necessary to complement the social norm of silence.
In addition, we believe that by formally enacting PSC rules, employers
provide some legitimacy to the norms of silence. Legitimacy is provided in
two ways. First, PSC rules help to disseminate and clarify the norm.
Conveying the norm at some point during the hiring process (whether
formally or informally) facilitates implementation of the norm and
minimizes potential misunderstandings."' Second, adoption by employers
of PSC rules helps give the norm of silence an air of authority. In short,
while PSC rules are consistent with the norms of silence existing in the
workplace, they may also be necessary for these norms to flourish, given
that forces exist that may result in non-compliant behavior.
D. Do PSC Rules Have a Place in Current Law?
During the past decade or so, the interplay of the law and social norms
has received increased attention. As in the case of college student music
file swapping/downloading, social norms sometimes lead individuals to
ignore or even disobey the law. Social norms and the potential for deviance
from social norms have led a significant number of employers in the United
States to adopt PSC rules, even though they generally violate the law. We
now turn to how this inconistency can be resolved." 9
V.
BALANCING THE LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS REGARDING EMPLOYER PSC
RULES
A. Overview
As noted earlier, the prevalence of PSC rules despite their general
illegality under the NLRA has commanded considerable recent legislative
attention. 2 °  The basic thrust of proposed and enacted federal/state
legislation has been strict censure of employers who use PSC rules.' 2' To
118. PSC rules are commonly found in employment manuals (see Fredericksburg Glass & Mirror,
Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 168 (1997)), or orally conveyed to employees at the time of hiring, or later in
the employment relationship (see NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Cr., 218 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2000)).
119. Do we, as various members of Congress have proposed, for example, seek greater
enforcement of the laws prohibiting PSC rules or do we, as some have suggested in the music file
swapping situation, more or less just "hang loose" and maintain the status quo? It is to these questions
that we now turn. See Levy, supra note 60, at 48.
120. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 128-135 and accompanying text.
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the extent that social norms favor PSC rules, however, it seems
questionable whether stricter enforcement alone will eliminate non-
compliance with the law. Somewhat analogously, for example, recent
enforcement efforts by the recording industry to overcome strong social
norms favoring college student music file-swapping have been met with
fierce resistance by various universities 112 as well as efforts to establish
music-sharing server services on off-shore platforms beyond the reach of
the U.S. recording industry. 23 In short, it appears very difficult, absent
perhaps an extraordinary allocation of governmental or other resources, for
the law to overcome strong social norms on issues like student music file-
swapping or employer adoption of pay confidentiality polices.1
24
In a sense, then, the issue becomes primarily one of how to best
balance law versus social norms. This essay argues, somewhat
counterintuitively, that the NLRA already balances these competing values
reasonably well. The one area where reform does seem appropriate, again
similar to the situation that exists with respect to music file-swapping, 25 is
with respect to increasing employee/consumer education.'26 What follows
is a discussion of this argument in the context of recent relevant efforts for
reform and insightful work by Professor Cass R. Sunstein dealing with
workplace norms and employee rights.
1 27
B. Efforts Towards Stricter Enforcement of PSC Rules
1. Bills in the U.S. Congress
PSC rules have caught the attention of the U.S. Congress. In the 10 6th
Congress, the 107 th Congress, and in the current 108 th Congress, legislators
have introduced bills dealing with this subject.28 All of the proposed bills
122. See Maureen Tkacik, Two Colleges Can Keep Data From Record Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug.
11, 2003, at A3.
123. See Gwendolyn Mariano, File-swapping Services Seek Refuge Overseas, available at
http://www.news.com/2100-1023-3-253530.html, published Mar. 5, 2001 (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
124. By way of further example, think about the problems that existed with police trying to enforce
old fifty-five mile per hour highway speed limits. But see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance
With the Law In The Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1334 (1998) (discussing the importance of
strongly enforcing speed limit laws).
125. See Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, supra note 15, at 505-10.
126. See Laws Don't Stop Music Swapping, Study Finds, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 1, 2003, at A26
(discussing the importance of consumer education in the area).
127. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 50. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and
the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205 (2001) [hereinafter "Sunstein, Human Behavior"].
128. See Fair Pay Act of 2001, S. 684, 107th Cong; Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 77, 107th Cong.
(2001); Fair Pay Act of 2001, H.R. 1362, 107th Cong.; Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 781, 107th Cong.
(2001); Wage Awareness Protection Act, S. 2966, 106th Cong. (2000); Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 74,
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have taken the form of amending sub-sections of the national wage and
hour law, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1935 ("FLSA"), 129 to make
workplace pay confidentiality/secrecy illegal. For example, in the 106 
th
Congress Senator James Jeffords of Vermont introduced the "Wage
Awareness Protection Act," which would have made it illegal for employers
to take any adverse employment action against any employee for inquiring
about or discussing wages. 13' The Jeffords bill would also have made it
illegal for any person "to make or enforce a written or oral confidentiality
policy that prohibits an employee from inquiring about, discussing, or
otherwise disclosing the wages of the employee or another employee.''
This legislation would have made it per se illegal for employers to have
PSC rules, even if there is no history of employer enforcement of such
rules. Relevant proposals presently before Congress take a generally
similar approach to the issue.
3 2
2. California Legislation
In September 2002 the California Legislature passed major
amendments to Section 232 of its state labor code, making it illegal for
employers to require as a condition of employment that employees refrain
from discussing their "working conditions," including wages.'3 3 The statute
states that employers cannot "discharge, formally discipline, or otherwise
discriminate against" employees who disclose to others the amount of their
wages. 34  The recent amendments, however, do limit the rights of
employees to discuss their "working conditions" by providing that the
legislation "is not intended to permit an employee to disclose proprietary
information, trade secret information, or information that is otherwise
subject to a legal privilege without the consent of his or her employer."' 35
This statutory limitation does not appear to apply with respect to employee
wage discussions. Thus, the new California law does not recognize any
privacy or other limitations on the rights of employees to discuss their pay.
106th Cong. (1999); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 541, 106th Cong. (1999). See also Paycheck Fairness
Act, S. 76, 108th Cong. (2003).
129. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
130. See H.R. 781, 107th Cong. § (4)(a); S. 2966, 106th Cong.
131. H.R. 781, 107th Cong. at § 2(a)(2).
132. See S. 76, 108th Cong.
133. CAL. LAB. CODE § 232 (2002).
134. Id.
135. Id. at § 232.5(d).
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C. Problems With Recent Congressional Proposals/State Legislation
The recent proposals in Congress and the California state legislation
make employer PSC rules "per se" illegal. The problem with this approach
is that it appears to be contrary to prevailing social norms and norm-related
considerations. 136 For example, one United States House of Representatives
co-sponsor of the proposed anti-PSC legislation noted that this legislation
would keep employers from "gagging employees by threatening them with
sanctions for freely discussing and learning the wages of their co-
workers." '137 The problem, however, is that a substantial percentage of
employees appear not to view PSC rules as "gags.' 38  These employees
may want to keep their pay to themselves as a matter of privacy, and to
avoid the potential workplace back-biting or conflict that might come with
free discussion of wages.139 Moreover, these employees may be in favor of
strongly rewarding employee firm-specific investments and of providing
employees non-volatile paychecks, activities that are facilitated by
employer PSC rules.14 ° Thus, the entire thrust of the California legislation
and the proposals in Congress on the subject appears to directly conflict
with prevailing social norms. While the new California legislation
recognizes, to some extent, the importance of privacy considerations with
respect to employee discussion of general "working conditions," it does not
recognize the existence of such considerations in the wage discussion area.
In addition, it appears that legislators have failed to recognize that
effective mechanisms to enforce these laws may not exit. The California
Labor Department's Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, for
example, has fewer than eighty field enforcement personnel conducting
workplace labor inspections of the roughly one million businesses in the
State of California. 4' Moreover, enforcement of regulations such as child
labor laws and overtime payments to workers tend to command far more
attention from these Labor Department field enforcement personnel than
enforcement of Labor Code section 232's "pay openness" mandate.
14 2
Similar enforcement limitations exist at the Wage and Hour Division of the
U.S. Department of Labor, the division which would have jurisdiction over
the issue under the relevant congressional proposals.'43 Finally, as noted
136. See supra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
137. See Press Release, Office of Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (June 12, 2001) (on file with
authors).
138. See supra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
141. Telephone Interviews With Various Top Officials (anonymity requested), State of California
Labor Department, Division of Labor Standards (Aug. 1, 2003).
142. Id.
143. See Williams, supra note 124, at 1334 n.260 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
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above, in some workplaces pay confidentiality policies exist on such an
informal basis that it might be virtually impossible for government
enforcement personnel to cite a business for any clear statutory violation
during an inspection visit, even if field enforcement personnel directly
inquired about this issue." In sum, there seem to be considerable problems
both with recent congressional proposals and the California legislation
dealing with pay secrecy rules.
D. Flexibility within the Current NLRA Approach
On its face, current NLRA regulation of the workplace pay
confidentiality area seems problematic.145 On closer examination, though,
the current NLRA regulatory regime is at least semi-workable. Professor
Cass Sunstein advocates flexible legal rules in today's workplace, arguing
forcefully against "one-size-fits-all" employment rules and endorsing the
development of schemes of "waivable" workers' rights.'46
Looked at through this lens, the NLRA creates a semi-workable
balance between the norm favoring PSC rules and the law by "de facto"
creating what might be termed a "reactive right" to pay openness. Unlike
the California Department of Labor, for example, the NLRB has no field
enforcement staff to enforce workplace pay openness policies. The
NLRA/NLRB enforcement mechanism is completely reactive in nature,
with the NLRB taking action only when an employee or union brings a
formal charge alleging a violation of the NLRA. 47 If no employees or
unions complain about employer PSC rules, these rules continue to exist
without any action by the NLRB even though they are clearly illegal under
the NLRA. Put another way, workplace norms of pay secrecy or
confidentiality will be maintained unless someone takes action of a kind
which forces the NLRB to react to specially enforce the NLRA's mandates
in this regard. The NLRA's regulatory scheme essentially gives employees
a right to pay confidentiality unless they consciously decide to waive this
enforcement capabilities of the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor).
144. See supra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
145. In earlier writing we have noted that the continued existence of employer PSC rules despite
their general illegality can, from one perspective, been seen as a sign of the NLRA's "impotence."
Neverthless, because of the numerous valid reasons for PSC rules we argue against amending the NLRA
with respect to this issue. See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and
the National Labor Relations Act, U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. (2003).
146. See Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 127, at 207.
147. See Fact Sheet on the National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Board,
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/facts.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). This attribute of the
NLRA has traditionally been described as a liability. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1533-37 (2002). We argue, however, that in the
context of PSC rules, the "reactive" nature of the NLRA is an asset, since it allows contrary norms to
develop, until there is enough of a counterforce to challenge the existing norm.
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right and step forward in a manner which forces the NLRB to enforce the
law. '48
The sharp decline in recent decades in the percentage of private sector
unionization to only about nine percent of the workforce, 149 as well as the
sharp decline in the annual number of labor representation elections, 5' has
made it increasingly unlikely that labor unions will confront the NLRB on
this issue. Moreover, recent trends toward greater employee
"individualism" and interest in privacy have probably decreased the
likelihood that individuals will bring the issue to the NLRB. 5' Since the
NLRB only reacts to charges brought on the matter, if no charges are
brought, workplace PSC rules will continue to flourish. Or, as Professor
Cass Sunstein might more elegantly put it, the "default rule" in American
workplaces today is one of pay confidentiality, with employees essentially
waiving their statutory right to pay openness under the NLRA. 52 Thus, the
NLRA has proven in this regard to be a flexible statute, a statute in sync
with prevailing social norms.
E. The "Notice" Problem: A Suggested Reform
There is one problem with the above analysis, a problem that resulted
in our labeling the present-day NLRA construct as only "semi-workable" in
nature. To the extent individual employees, for example, are essentially
waiving their rights to pay openness by not bringing charges on the issue to
the NLRB, it is important to make sure employees know exactly what rights
they are waiving.'53 However, there is strong evidence that employees in
non-union work settings have little idea about their rights under the
NLRA.154
148. A rather rough analogy thus might be the military's famous "don't ask, don't tell" policies
regarding gay rights, which basically stated that rules prohibiting gays in the military will not be
enforced unless someone steps forward to force the military to react and enforce these rules. See U. S.
Military's "Don't Ask Don't Tell" Policy Panders to Prejudice, Human Rights Watch, HUMAN RIGHTS
NEWS, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/0l/us0l2303.htm. (Jan. 23, 2003).
149. See Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America at 2, 4 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 03-14, 2003) (on file
with authors) (describing the decline in private sector union representation).
150. In 1975 over 7700 NLRB representation elections were held involving close to half a million
workers, while in 2002 less than 2900 such elections were held involving far less than half that number
of workers. See National Labor Relations Board, Summary of Field Operations, Office of General
Counsel, Feb. 4, 2003 (on file with authors).
151. See Margalioth, supra note 75; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000) (recognizing the individualistic tendencies
at play in today's civil society, but arguing that opposite forces might operate at the workplace).
152. See Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 127, at 206.
153. Id. See also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an A t- Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 106 (1997).
154. Kim, supra note 153, at 106.
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As noted above, Section 7 of the NLRA explicitly protects all
employees who engage in "concerted activity for the purpose of... other
mutual aid or protection."' This said, the application of the NLRA in
nonunion settings is, as Professor William R. Corbett has noted, "one of the
best-kept secrets" of employment law. 151 Thus, many employees simply
have no idea that they have a statutory right to pay openness in their
workplaces. 57 Consequently, their "de facto" waiver of this right is not
truly "informed." As Professor Cass Sunstein has argued, employees
should be entitled to adequate information about their workplace rights
before they engage in any sort of waiver of these rights.'
Professor Charles Morris raises one promising, at least partial, solution
to this problem. Noting that unorganized employees may not know of their
rights under the NLRA, and that there is an "urgent need" to inform them of
such rights, Professor Morris filed a rulemaking petition on this subject
with the NLRB. 5 1 In his petition, he proposed a general notice and posting
requirement for all employers subject to NLRA jurisdiction. 160  More
specifically, this rule would require employers to prominently post in their
workplaces a poster, similar to that presently required with respect to the
minimum wage under the FLSA, setting forth employee/employer rights
under the NLRA. 16 1
Although filed over a decade ago, Professor Morris' petition is still
pending before the NLRB.'62 The NLRB should expeditiously adopt
Professor Morris' petition. It would represent an important first step in
making sure all employees are better informed about their rights regarding
PSC rules, and make the NLRA's regulatory scheme in this regard more
"workable." Prevailing social norms are such that even fully knowing their
rights under the NLRA, the vast majority of employees are still highly
unlikely to bring charges regarding this matter to the NLRB. That said,
employees should be allowed to make a clearly informed choice.'63
155. This protection applies not just to employees represented by labor unions, but also to nearly all
private sector employees in the United States, and the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld NLRA's broad-
scale protection of non-unionized workers in this regard. See Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion
Workplace, supra note 14; NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). See also supra notes 32-
41 and accompanying text.
156. See William Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old
Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002).
157. See generally Kim, supra note 153.
158. See Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 127, at 242-45.
159. See Rulemaking Petition of Prof. Morris, supra note 14.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Telephone Interview, Jeffrey D. Wedekind, Solicitor, National Labor Relations Board (July 3,
2003).
163. See Sunstein, Human Behavior, supra note 127, at 207 (discussing the need for employees to
have full information about employment terms so that they can make informed choices).




The widespread existence of employer PSC rules in the United States
represents a fascinating case study of the interplay between law and social
norms. In this case, the reactive nature of the NLRA has allowed social
norms to overcome weakly enforced law. Recently introduced
congressional bills would conflict with these norms, as does the already
enacted legislation in California. This essay argues that these legislative
proposals/legislation are flawed. The social norms favoring workplace pay
secrecy/confidentiality make both practical and economic sense, and should
not be disturbed. Moreover, it seems unclear, at best, to what extent laws
trying to overcome these norms can realistically be enforced. In this regard,
the NLRA's regulatory framework of enforcing the law only after
employees and others complain appears to be the preferred approach.
However, per Professor Morris' rulemaking petition, employees should be
afforded better information about their rights to pay openness in the
workplace. As Professor Sunstein has forcefully argued, employees are
entitled to adequate information about their workplace rights prior to any
sort of waiver of these rights.64
164. Id.
2004
HeinOnline  -- 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 191 2004
192 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT& LABOR LAW Vol. 25:1
HeinOnline  -- 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 192 2004
